Exclusion-intersection encryption by Chow, SSM & Yiu, SM
Title Exclusion-intersection encryption
Author(s) Chow, SSM; Yiu, SM
Citation
The 1st IEEE International Workshop on Security in Computers,
Networking and Communications (SCNC 2011) in conjuntion
with IEEE INFOCOM 2011, Shanghai, China, 10-15 April 2011. In
Conference Proceedings of INFOCOM WKSHPS, 2011, p. 1048-
1053
Issued Date 2011
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/139991
Rights IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops,INFOCOM WKSHPS. Copyright © IEEE.
Exclusion-Intersection Encryption
Sherman S.M. Chow
Department of Combinatorics and Optimization
University of Waterloo
Ontario, Canada N2L3G1
smchow@math.uwaterloo.ca
Siu-Ming Yiu
Department of Computer Science
University of Hong Kong
Pokfulam, Hong Kong
smyiu@cs.hku.hk
Abstract—Identity-based encryption (IBE) has shown to be a
useful cryptographic scheme enabling secure yet flexible role-
based access control. We propose a new variant of IBE named
as exclusion-intersection encryption: during encryption, the sender
can specify the targeted groups that are legitimate and interested
in reading the documents; there exists a trusted key generation
centre generating the intersection private decryption keys on
request. This special private key can only be used to decrypt
the ciphertext which is of all the specified groups’ interests, its
holders are excluded from decrypting when the documents are
not targeted to all these groups (e.g., the ciphertext of only a
single group’s interest). While recent advances in cryptographic
techniques (e.g., attribute-based encryption or wicked IBE) can
support a more general access control policy, the private key size
may be as long as the number of attributes or identifiers that
can be specified in a ciphertext, which is undesirable, especially
when each user may receive a number of such keys for different
decryption power. One of the applications of our notion is to
support an ad-hoc joint project of two or more groups which
needs extra helpers that are not from any particular group.
Index Terms—access control, applied cryptography, compact
private key, data confidentiality, identity-based encryption, pair-
ings
I. INTRODUCTION
Controlling the access of data via complex policies is al-
ways a challenging issue, especially for dynamic organizations
where people assume different roles in different (possibly
ad-hoc) projects and people’s roles may change over time.
Identity-based encryption (IBE) [1] (and the references in [2])
has shown to be a useful cryptographic scheme enabling secure
yet flexible role-based access control [3], [4], [5], [6], [7],
[8], [9] (in particular, the access of the plaintext encrypted
in a ciphertext). One of the reasons is that the access control
policy can be expressed using an identity string as a basic unit,
for example, we may specify a time in the string to realize
a time-specific access control policy (e.g., [8], [9] and the
references within). This identity-based encryption technique
has also been leveraged to devise attribute-based encryption
(e.g., [10], [11], [12]) which provide a cryptographic access
control solution with a more fine-grained access policy. On the
other hand, many identity-based (ID-based) schemes have been
adopted to solve a particular set of problems more efficiently,
e.g., for speeding up the signing algorithm we have ID-based
signature scheme which allows multiple keys per user [13]; for
speeding up the encryption algorithm we have IBE for multiple
recipients [14]; and we have IBE schemes for other design
goals such as having a “powerful” identity-based private key
where wildcards can be specified as part of the identity-strings
(without giving an exponential number of private keys) in
wicked IBE [15], etc.
In this paper, we propose a special kind of IBE named
as exclusion-intersection encryption: during encryption, the
sender can specify the target groups (say A, B, and C) that are
legitimate and interested to read the documents. There exists
a trusted key generation centre (KGC) generating intersection
private decryption keys (e.g., A ∩ B ∩ C, B ∩ C or just A)
on request. We use the “∩” notation from the key’s decryption
power perspective: the key for A∩B is a less powerful key than
the key for A, analogous to the fact that A∩B is a subset of A.
This private key can be used to decrypt the ciphertext which
is of all the groups’ interests as specified by the key (e.g., the
decryption key of A∩B∩C can decrypt the ciphertext which
is of all of A and B and C’s interests). Decryption is also
possible when the group-identifiers specified in the ciphertext
contains the identifiers specified in the key (e.g., the decryption
key of A can decrypt the ciphertext designated to only A, or
both A and B, or all of A, B and C). But its holders are
excluded from decrypting when the documents are not targeted
to all these groups (e.g., the decryption key of A ∩ B ∩ C
can neither decrypt the ciphertext targeted to A ∩ B, nor the
ciphertext targeted to C). In other words, decryption is not
possible since the group-identifiers specified in the ciphertext
does not contain all the identifiers specified in the key (e.g.,
C is missing from the description A ∩ B, so the decryption
key of A ∩ B ∩ C cannot decrypt the ciphertext targeted to
A ∩B).
Obviously, we do not want the ciphertext size to be in
the order of the size of the power set, i.e., O(2`) for `
possible groups. On the other hand, constant size private
keys are desirable. Otherwise, this can be trivially done by a
traditional IBE when users get the private keys corresponding
to all possible “extension” of identifiers (e.g., {A,A∩B,A∩
C, · · · , A ∩ B ∩ C, · · · }. In this paper, we propose a scheme
which achieves linear-size ciphertexts and constant-size private
key. Our proposed scheme uses an identity-based key structure
modified from Sakai-Kasahara IBE [16] and uses REACT
transformation [17] to achieve chosen-ciphertext security, and
hence our security analysis is given in the random oracle
model.
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A. Applications
1) Ad-Hoc Collaborative Group Work: This class of en-
cryption scheme finds natural application in supporting ad-
hoc joint projects of two or more groups which needs extra
helpers that are not from any particular group. The KGC only
needs to generate the intersection private key to these extra
helpers, then all parties concerned (both the original groups
and those new helpers) can decrypt the documents for this joint
project, but these new helpers cannot decrypt the documents
which are confidential to any proper subset of groups. The
key distribution is minimal as only these new helpers (instead
of all related people of the project) need to get a new key.
In particular, the people who already got the decryption right
do not require to get another key, and hence the trouble of
managing many keys such as deciding which key to use in
which situation can be avoided. Besides, our proposed scheme
supports constant private key size1 which is especially helpful
when people may have multiple duties and get a number of
keys corresponding to different decryption power.
Our scheme supports cryptographic workflow [7], [18] in
the sense that sender can create the encrypted documents even
if the decryption key are yet to be generated by KGC and
obtained by the related parties. Our scheme is useful when
the sender does not have the knowledge of the access-control
policy nor the hierarchy of the groups in an organization.
Consider an applicant for PhD programme who just got a
few more papers accepted for publication and wants to submit
a more updated version of his curriculum vitae (CV) to
a certain university so as to increase his chance of being
admitted. The application committee usually consists of the
staff members from both the graduate school (“Grad. Sch.”),
the admission office (“Admission”), and the department of
interest, say Department of Computer Science (“CS”). By
using our proposed exclusion-intersection encryption, he can
encrypt his CV to “Grad. Sch.”, “Admission”, “CS”. As a
result, the staff members at graduate school, admission office,
and CS department or a special group of people (hereinafter
referred as “Helpers”) only handling graduate admission of
CS (if such a group exists) can decrypt and read his CV,
irrespective of the private key issuing policy of the university.
On the other hand, if there are other emails directed at
Graduate School and CS Department which are not related
to admission, say the annual review of CS graduate students,
this group of admission helpers cannot decrypt.
2) Privacy-Respecting Supervision: We can also use this
scheme in another way round. In hierarchical IBE [19] (and
the references in [2]), the one at a higher level of hierarchy
(say the manager) has a higher decryption power (i.e., can
decrypt the ciphertext designated to the users at a lower level
of hierarchy, usually his group of sub-ordinates). Now we
consider the scenario that the privacy of sub-ordinates is of
importance, such that their manager cannot read their private
1As a consequence, there should be many different attribute sets that result
in the same key. The structure of the key should ensure that if an adversary
can find such two attribute sets, it results in some non-trivial relation between
a set of collusion-resistant hash functions.
message unless the message is of whole group’s interests.
Suppose there is a group of students {idi|i ∈ [1, t]} with a
supervisor. One can assign the key id1 ∩ id2 · · · ∩ idt to the
supervisor. In doing so, the supervisor cannot read a private
message directed to only one or a subgroup of students, but he
can decrypt the encrypted messages when all students in his
group are appointed as receivers. Unfortunately, in contrast to
the previous application, re-keying (to the manager) is required
if some new members join the group. We also remark that there
is a variant of hierarchical IBE which is called structural IBE
[20], in which a user can decrypt ciphertext for all his/her
ancestors (but not descendants) in the hierarchy, in contrast
with a normal hierarchical IBE.
B. Organizations
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work
on access control from elliptic curve pairings and various
different variants of identity-based encryption are discussed
in next section. Section III contains the framework and the
security notions for exclusion-intersection encryption. Our
proposed construction will be presented in Section IV, which
includes a description of the building blocks being used in
our proposed scheme, and the number-theoretical assumptions
related to the security of our scheme. Efficiency and security
analysis will also be given. We conclude the paper in Section
V.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Conjunction and Disjunction Policy by IBE Techniques
Notions similar to our concept of exclusion-intersection
encryption can be found in [3] and [6], which considered
the “conjunction” and “disjunction” of private keys associated
with multiple identities. By conjunction, any entity who has
all the private keys involved with an encrypted message can
do the decryption; while disjunction means any one who has
at least one of the private keys involved with an encrypted
message can get the plaintext. In [14], [21], [22], [23], efficient
multi-receiver identity-based encryption (i.e., encryption in
“disjunction” model) were proposed together with formal
models and security proofs. In [24], identity-based broad-
cast (multi-receiver) encryption with constant size ciphertexts
and private keys are proposed. However, there is no work
addressing exactly the access control policy we considered.
We acknowledge that schemes supporting even more general
access control policy exist, but we will see shortly afterward
that the generalities come with higher computational costs or
secure storage requirements. In particular, our scheme supports
constant size private key and requires only a constant number
of pairing operations in decryption.
B. Hierarchical IBE and Wicked IBE
It may seem possible to achieve the same functionalities
with hierarchical IBE, but we argue that it is not always the
case. Back to our example on CS graduate school application,
the applicant may not know the hierarchy of the groups in
that university (for examples, whether the graduate school1049
is at a level higher than the CS department or if there is a
group of people handling graduate admissions under the CS
department), or simply there is no such hierarchy. One of the
possible solution is that both of the graduate school and the
CS department generate the “descendants private key” for CS
department and graduate school respectively, i.e., the helpers
will get both the private key corresponding to “Grad. Sch.”
→ “CS” and “CS” → “Grad. Sch” (where A → B denotes
A is at a level higher than B). It seems that the same result
can be achieved as (1) the sender does not need to know the
hierarchy (i.e., he can use either “Grad. Sch.”→ “CS” or “CS”
→ “Grad. Sch.” as the identifier), (2) the helpers cannot read
the existing encrypted document for “Grad. Sch.” and “CS” (as
being at the lower level of the hierarchy), (3) the KGC only
needs to generate private key for the helpers. However, this
way is not scalable if the number of different groups involved
increases.
While one can solve the above problem by restricting
the level where an identity can appear (in other words, the
identifiers space are partitioned) [22], [23], e.g., for a 2-level
IBE, “CS Department” is restricted to appear only at the
second level. This does not make the problem trivial since
the KGC is now required to generate a private key for the
second level directly which “skips” the first level. This leads
to the notion of identity-based encryption with wild-card key
derivation (or wicked IBE) [15], such that a private key for
a vector of identity strings can have entries which are left
blank using a wildcard. However, both constructions in [15]
have decryption key sizes grow linearly with the number of
wildcards, i.e., the more powerful the key, the larger it is. One
may view our proposal as a wicked IBE without further key
derivation, which is the price we pay for a constant size private
key.
C. Attribute-based Encryption and Hidden-Vector Encryption
The access control policy considers in this paper is actually
covered by key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE)
[10]. For a ciphertext marked with attributes A, B and C,
all the keys in the powerset of {A,B,C}, e.g., A ∩ B ∩ C
or B ∩C, can be generated by the KGC and can be used for
decryption of such a ciphertext. However, the size of the key in
KP-ABE usually grows linearly with the number of attributes
it encompasses. Besides, for these schemes the number of
pairing operations required in decryption also grows linearly
with the number of attributes embedded in the decryption key.
On the other hand, it is unclear how to use ciphertext-policy
ABE [11] to achieve our purpose efficiently. The private key
size usually grows linearly with the number of attributes. We
may also need to specify the ciphertext under a policy like “A
OR B OR C OR (A ∩B) · · · OR (A ∩B ∩ C).
One may also realize the same functionality as our scheme
by using hidden-vector encryption (HVE) [25], which pro-
vides conjunctive queries over multi-valued attributes. HVE
associates a ciphertext with a vector x = (x1, · · · , x`) and
each key K with a vector y = (y1, · · · , y`). Each element of
a vector can be chosen from a predefined range. Key K can
decrypt ciphertext C if and only if x = y for all i where yi 6= ∗
(∗ is a wildcard symbol). Using our previous example, we may
identify A with x1, B with x2 and C with x3. A ciphertext
for B and C is encrypted under vector x = (0, 1, 1). The
decryption key of B is identified with vector (∗, 1, ∗), for C
it will be identified with vector (∗, ∗, 1), B ∩C uses (∗, 1, 1),
and finally the decryption key of A∩B ∩C is identified with
vector (1, 1, 1). However, existing schemes [25], [26] have
O(`)-size keys and use O(`) pairings per decryption where ` is
the number of the fields; but HVE supports more expressive
queries and these two schemes can be proven secure in the
standard model.
III. EXCLUSION-INTERSECTION ENCRYPTION
From now on, we will use the generic term “identity’
throughout our discussion to replace the notion of “group” we
used in the introduction in Section I. To bridge the gap, one
may simply think of the groups involved in our motivating
scenario are now all identified by different strings. In other
words, the identity in the scheme will be the group identifier.
A. Framework
• Setup(1k, `): On an unary string input 1k and a positive
integer ` where k is a security parameter and ` denotes
the maximum number of identity that can be associated to
a user trapdoor, it produces the master secret key msk and
the public parameters param, which include a description
of a finite plaintext space and a description of a finite
ciphertext space. We omitted the inclusion of the public
parameters as part of the input in the descriptions of the
remaining algorithms.
• Trapdoor(msk, {Qi}): Taking a single identity or a list
of identities {Qi} as the input, where the size of {Qi}
cannot be larger than `, it uses the master secret key msk
to produce a trapdoor T{Qi}, which is the private key for
a single identity or an “intersection private key” for the
identities string, depending on the size of {Qi}).
• Encrypt(m, {Wi}): For a plaintext message m together
with a single identity or a list of targeted identities {Wi},
it produces an exclusion-intersection encryption S{Wi} of
m.
• Decrypt(S, T{Qi}): Given a ciphertext S{Wi} encrypting
m, if the identities associated with the trapdoor T{Qi} is
a subset of the targeted identities associated with S{Wi},
i.e., {Qi} ⊆ {Wi}, outputs m; ‘⊥’ otherwise.
B. Security
We consider the de-facto standard of a secure identity-based
encryption scheme, which is indistinguishability against adap-
tive chosen-ciphertext attacks. For our exclusion-intersection
encryption, security is defined by the sID-IND-EIE-CCA2
game below played between a challenger C and an adversary
A.
Setup: The challenger C takes a security parameter k and the
parameter ` which governs the maximum number of identities
that can be associated to a user trapdoor as input, runs1050
Setup(1k, `) to generate common public parameters param
and the master secret key msk. C sends param to A.
Phase 1: The adversary A can perform a polynomially (in
k) bounded number of queries in an adaptive manner (that
is, each query may depend on the responses to the previous
queries). The types of queries allowed are described below.
• Trapdoor: A chooses a list of identities {Qi}, C com-
putes Trapdoor(msk, {Qi}) and sends the result to A.
• Decrypt: A chooses a ciphertext S, C computes a
trapdoor that can decrypt S according to the identities
specified by the adversary, decrypts the ciphertext S and
sends the resulting plaintext m or the symbol ⊥ to A.
Challenge: The adversary A decides when Phase 1 ends.
Then, it outputs two equal length plaintexts, m0 and m1, and
a set of identities {idi}i∈[1,t],t≤` on which it wishes to be
challenged. The set {idi}i∈[1,t],t≤` or a subset of it should not
appear in any Trapdoor queries in Phase 1. The challenger
C picks a random bit b from {0, 1}, computes S = Encrypt
(mb, {idi}i∈[1,t],t≤`) and returns S to A.
Phase 2: The adversary A can ask a polynomially bounded
number of queries adaptively again as in Phase 1 with the
similar restriction on Trapdoor query and the restriction that
a Decrypt query to obtain the plaintext for S cannot be made.
Guess: The adversary A has to output a guess b′. It wins the
game if b′ = b. The advantage of A is defined as Adv(A) =
|2Pr[b′ = b] − 1| (where Pr[b′ = b] denotes the probability
that b′ = b).
For our scheme, we consider a “selective-ID” (sID) variant,
such that the adversary’s choice of all identifiers for the
challenge ciphertext must be in given before the setup of the
public system parameter.
Definition 1: An exclusion-intersection encryption scheme
is said to have the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attacks property if no adversary has a non-negligible
advantage in the sID-IND-EIE-CCA2 game.
IV. PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION
A. Building Blocks
1) Pairings and Related Number-Theoretic Problems: Pair-
ing is an useful number-theoretic primitive for cryptographic
uses. In particular, many cryptographic access control schemes
and identity-/attribute-based encryption schemes are based on
elliptic-curve pairings. Some examples include [1], [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [14], [15], [16], [18], [19], [20], [21],
[22], [23], [24], [10], [11], [25]. We describe some of the key
properties of these bilinear groups and the pairing function.
Let (G0,+) and (GT , ·) be two cyclic groups of prime order
p. Pairing is given as eˆ : G0 ×G0 → GT , which satisfies the
following properties:
1) Bilinearity: eˆ(P + Q,R) = eˆ(P,R)eˆ(Q,R), eˆ(P,Q +
R) = eˆ(P,Q)eˆ(P,R) ∀P,Q,R ∈ G0.
2) Non-degeneracy: There exists P,Q ∈ G0 such that
eˆ(P,Q) 6= 1.
3) Computability: It is efficient to compute eˆ(P,Q)
∀P,Q ∈ G0.
Definition 2: Given two groups G0 and GT of the same
prime order p, and a generator P of G0, the Compu-
tational/Decisional q-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion (q-
BDHI) problem in (G0,GT ) is, given (P, xP, x2P, · · · , xqP )
to compute eˆ(P, P )1/x, or to decide if tˆ = eˆ(P, P )1/x when
additionally given tˆ, respectively.
We relate the decisional 1-BDHI problem and the DBDH
problem defined below.
Definition 3: Given two groups G0 and GT of the same
prime order p, a bilinear map eˆ : G0×G0 → GT and a gener-
ator P of G0, the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH)
problem in (G0,GT ) is to decide whether h = eˆ(P, P )abc
given (P, aP, bP, cP ) and an element h ∈ GT .
Lemma 1: DBDH problem is easy implies decisional 1-
BDHI problem is easy.
Proof: Given (P, xP, tˆ) ∈ G20×GT , feed (xP, P, P, P, tˆ)
into a DBDH oracle, let R = xP , i.e., P = 1xR,
tˆ = eˆ(P, P )1/x if and only if tˆ = eˆ(R,R)
1
x
1
x
1
x . To see,
eˆ( 1xR,
1
xR)
1
x = eˆ(P, P )
1
x .
2) REACT CCA Transformation: There exists transform
techniques such as [27] which can convert a “weakly-secure”
(security against a weaker form of attack which is called
chosen-plaintext attack (CPA), in which the adversary does
not have access of any decryption oracle), e.g., OW-CPA or
IND-CPA encryption scheme, into one that is indistinguishable
against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). REACT [17]
is the one we chose in our proposed construction. It is quite
efficient as it just adds two more hashings to the underlying
encryption and the decryption algorithm, assuming the un-
derlying scheme is one-way against plaintext checking attack
(PCA). PCA means that the adversary has access to an oracle
which, on input a message/ciphertext pair (m, c), tells if c
encrypts m or not.
While this oracle maybe easy to simulate for plain RSA-
based cryptosystem, we often need to employ some kind of
gap assumption for Diffie-Hellman-based encryption scheme,
i.e., a certain computational problem is intractable even if
there exists an oracle which solve the decisional version of
the problem. For our reduction, the simulator just requires an
oracle to solve the decisional 1-BDHI problem (instead of q-
BDHI problem for q > 1), which can be easily solved when
there is a DBDP oracle as shown by Lemma 1. We call this
as the gap q-BDHI problem.
We stress that the actual construction does not require the
DBDP oracle. We chose to use the REACT transformation for
simpler design of our CCA-secure scheme. A shortcoming of
this is that the security proof may not be falsifiable.
3) Identity Partition: As discussed in the review section,
another tool we need is the concept of identity partition, such
that the whole identity space is partitioned into ` different
disjoint partitions and encryption can only be done with re-
spect to identities which do not come from the same partition.
The partition is defined by a publicly computable surjective
function from an identity to a number between 1 and `. While1051
it is a restriction, we note that it is not entirely impractical;
for example, a ciphertext cannot be marked as both “casual”
and “urgent” at the same time.
4) Hash Functions: Our scheme employs the following
cryptographic (collision-resistant) hash functions, which are
modelled by random oracles in our security analysis:
• H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp,
• H2 : GT → {0, 1}|M | where |M | denotes the length of
the message,
• H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k, where k is the security parameter
of the scheme.
B. Algorithms
The key generation center executes the Setup algorithm
at the first place. After that, it also generates on demand the
trapdoor T{Qi} for a set of identities {Qi} using the Trapdoor
algorithm. Anyone can use the Encrypt algorithm to encrypt
a message m for the appointed recipients as defined by {Wi}.
Finally, the one holding the trapdoor T{Qi} can decrypt the
ciphertext if {Qi} ⊆ {Wi}.
The design of our scheme is largely based on one of the
public-key encryption schemes supporting conjunctive field
keyword proposed by Park et al. [28]. We use the random-
looking element which determining the search result in their
scheme as an one-time pad for encrypting the message in our
case. Nevertheless, not every such a scheme can be easily
converted to an exclusion-intersection encryption scheme. In
particular, if we try to use a similar kind of transformation on
another scheme [28], it is not clear how all possible decryption
keys can lead to the same random padding. In more details,
there are an exponential number (in `) of possible elements
from their search algorithm, which also makes the ciphertext-
size to be exponential (in `, the number of identities associated
with a ciphertext) in our case when these elements are used
as one-time pads to encrypt the message. Moreover, as a
searchable encryption, their work did not consider chosen-
ciphertext security. For this we applied REACT transformation
[17] to get this higher level of security.
• Setup(1k,`): Let p be the order of the groups G0 and
GT which is determined by the security parameter k. Let
G : Zp → {1, · · · , `} be a publicly computable surjective
function which defines the partition of the identities, and
let h(·) = G(H1(·)). The algorithm chooses random
numbers y1 · · · , y`, z1, z2 ∈ Zp and a generator U of
G0. It outputs the public parameters param = 〈U, Y1 =
y1U, · · · , Y` = y`U,Z1 = z1U,Z2 = z2U, gˆ = eˆ(U,U)〉
and the master secret key msk = 〈y1, · · · , y`, z1, z2〉.
• Trapdoor(msk, {Qi}i∈[1,t],t≤`): Selects a random num-
ber u ∈ Zp and computes T{Qi}i∈[1,t],t≤` = 〈T1, T2, u〉
where
– T1 = ( 1yh(Q1)+···+yh(Qt)+H1(Q1)+···+H1(Qt)+z2u )U
– T2 = 1z1T1
• Encrypt(m, {Wi}i∈[1,n],n≤`):
1) Computes a set W ′ = {h(W1), · · · , h(Wn)}.
2) For each j ∈ W ′, selects a random number rj ∈ Zp.
3) Computes a set B = {rjZ1}.
4) Picks r0 ∈ Zp and rˆ ∈ GT uniformly at random.
5) Computes C = r0Z2.
6) Computes xˆ = gˆr0 · rˆ.
7) Encrypts the message by E = m⊕H2(rˆ).
8) Computes a set A = {r0(Yj +H1(Wj)U) + rjU}.
9) Computes σ = H3(rˆ||m||A||B||C||E||xˆ), where all
the group elements are interpreted as bit strings and
|| represents the string concatenation operator.
10) Outputs the ciphertext as 〈A = (A1, · · · , An),B =
(B1, · · · , Bn), C,E, xˆ, σ〉.
• Decrypt(S = 〈A1, · · · , An, B1, · · · , Bn, C,E, xˆ, σ〉,
T{Qi} = 〈T1, T2, u〉):
1) Proceeds if {Qi} ⊆ {Wi}, aborts otherwise.
2) Computes a set Q′ = {h(Q1), · · · , h(Qt)}.
3) Computes rˆ′ = xˆ/ (eˆ(
∑
i∈Q′ Ai)+uC,T1)
eˆ(
∑
i∈Q′ Bi,T2)
.
4) Recovers m′ = E ⊕H2(rˆ′).
5) If σ = H3(rˆ||m′||A1|| · · · ||B1|| · · · ||Bn||C||E||xˆ),
outputs m′ which is the decrypted message; other-
wise, outputs ⊥.
C. Correctness
For correctness, if {Qi} ⊆ {Wi}, that means Q′ ⊆ W ′; we
have
rˆ′ = xˆ/
(eˆ(
∑
i∈Q′ Ai) + uC, T1)
eˆ(
∑
i∈Q′ Bi, T2)
= xˆ/
(eˆ(
∑
i∈Q′ Ai) + uC, T1)
eˆ( 1z1
∑
i∈Q′ Bi, T1)
= xˆ/
(eˆ(
∑
i∈Q′ r0(Yi +H1(Wi)U) + riU) + uC, T1)
eˆ(
∑
i∈Q′ riU, T1)
= xˆ/(eˆ(
∑
i∈Q′
r0(Yi +H1(Wi)U) + uC, T1)
= xˆ/(eˆ(
∑
i∈Q′
r0(yi +H1(Wi))U + ur0z2U, T1)
= gˆr0 · rˆ/gˆr0
= rˆ
D. Efficiency
Regarding efficiency, our scheme inherits the following
benefits of Sakai-Kasahara IBE [16]. The admissible encoding
scheme hashing to G0 [1], which may be computationally
expensive in some settings, is not needed. Besides, no pairing
operation is needed for the generation of trapdoor and encryp-
tion, while it only takes two pairing operations for decryption.
E. Security
The following theorem summarizes the security of our
scheme.
Theorem 1: In the random oracle model (the hash functions
are modeled as random oracles), if we have an adversary A
that is able to win the sID-IND-EIE-CCA2 game (i.e., A is
able to distinguish ciphertexts given by the challenger), with
an advantage  when running in a time t and asking at most1052
qH identifier hashing queries, at most qT trapdoor generation
queries, at most qS H2 queries, at most qR H3 queries, and qD
decryption queries; there exists a simulator C that can solve the
gap (qT + 1)-BDHI problem with non-negligible probability.
The proof can be found in the full version due to page
limitations.
V. CONCLUSION
We introduce the notion of Exclusion-Intersection Encryp-
tion, with a concrete construction, which provides a flexible
solution for the access control of the plaintext message en-
crypted in a ciphertext. We argue that exclusion-intersection
encryption maybe more suitable than traditional PKI-based
schemes, hierarchical identity-based encryption schemes or
attribute-based encryption schemes, for scenarios where ad-
hoc collaborative group work are often and compact private
keys are desirable. The security of our scheme is asserted
in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of the
gap q-bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion problem. We believe
that exclusion-intersection encryption will give rise to other
innovative applications other than those we described. We left
as open problems to construct an exclusion-intersection en-
cryption scheme which either works without identity-partition
or is secure without random oracles.
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